

*Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there be printed with illustrations as a Senate document selected excerpts on the 1963-1964 national high school debate proposition: "What Should Be the Role of the Federal Government in Providing Medical Care to the Citizens of the United States", compiled by the Education and Public Welfare Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress; and that there be printed twenty-five thousand six hundred and sixty-five additional copies of such document, of which ten thousand three hundred shall be for the use of the Senate and fifteen thousand three hundred and sixty-five shall be for the use of the House of Representatives.*

#### PRINTING AS SENATE DOCUMENT OF 65TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DAUGHTERS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

The resolution (S. Res. 159) authorizing the printing of the 65th Annual Report of the National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution as a Senate document, was considered and agreed to, as follows:

*Resolved, That the sixty-fifth annual report of the National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution for the year ended March 1, 1962, be printed, with an illustration, as a Senate document.*

#### PRINTING AS SENATE DOCUMENT OF STUDY ENTITLED "PROBLEMS AND TRENDS IN ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP—II"

The resolution (S. Res. 152) to print as a Senate document the study entitled "Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership—II," was considered and agreed to, as follows:

*Resolved, That there be printed as a Senate document a staff study entitled "Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership—II", prepared at the request of the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and that six thousand additional copies of such document be printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations.*

#### PRINTING AS SENATE DOCUMENT OF "SELECTED REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES"

The resolution (S. Res. 156) authorizing the printing as a Senate document of "Selected Reports of the Administrative Conference of the United States," was considered and agreed to, as follows:

*Resolved, That there be printed as a Senate document "Selected Reports of the Administrative Conference of the United States", submitted by the chairman of the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure to the Committee on the Judiciary, and that there be printed two thousand additional copies of such document for the use of that committee.*

#### PRINTING FOR USE OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF ADDITIONAL COPIES OF ITS HEARINGS ON "PACIFICA FOUNDATION"

The resolution (S. Res. 157) authorizing the printing for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary of additional

copies of its hearings on "Pacifica Foundation," was considered, and agreed to, as follows:

*Resolved, That there be printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary four thousand five hundred additional copies each of parts 2 and 3 of the hearings on "Pacifica Foundation", issued by its Internal Security Subcommittee during the Eighty-eighth Congress, first session.*

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, that concludes the call of measures on the calendar. There will be no further pieces of proposed legislation taken up at this time. I thank the Senator from Colorado for his forbearance and courtesy.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado has the floor.

#### CUBAN LIBERATION: A PROPOSAL

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, there is a time in the policy councils of a free nation for measured deliberation and even for conscious delay. Until all of the facts are in hand, until they are confirmed beyond a reasonable doubt, and until the public mind and the national will have coalesced into an overwhelming consensus—that is the time for deliberate indecision.

But there is also a time for decision—and for decisive action. And then, soaring rhetoric must give way to purposeful deeds.

We have arrived at such a time—in sober fact, at the moment of truth—in this Nation's confrontation with world Communist imperialism.

Still more, we are face to face with the moral imperatives of our national honor. The weight of our words, and the value of our most solemn pledges, are now hanging in the balance. And it will be a dark day indeed for the cause of freedom, everywhere in the world, if they are found wanting.

My subject is Cuba. My concern is Cuba. My concern is the liberation of that terribly oppressed people; and the removal of a leprous sore gnawing away at the very life of this hemisphere.

I speak today to my peers in this co-equal branch of the National Government—and thus also to and for the American people—in the name of our blemished national honor and with the mandate of a collective judgment that can no longer go unrepresented. We must take up the burden of responsible leadership that has so long been defaulted by our executive officials. It is time, at long last, to make good their own pledge of Cuban liberation. It is time, to put the matter most bluntly, to fulfill the same mission begun at the Bay of Pigs—to establish a beachhead of freedom on Cuban soil. Only this time we must get the job done, as I shall propose.

It is right and proper that the Congress should be the forum for such critical public debate—leading first to unequivocal decision and then to bold action. What better place, indeed, than the representative assembly of the whole American community to bring to a focus the mounting tide of public anger and public frustration over a Cuba policy of planned procrastination? If the execu-

tive will not lead—will not represent what I am convinced is the hardened will of the American people—then where but here can responsible action originate?

This action began a few days ago, in my judgment, when the able Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORRIS] subjected to careful scrutiny the Cuban policy of this administration. His analysis was dispassionate; but not the implications that so indisputably emerge from this sorry record of delay and deceit, of empty rhetoric, and of bold promises timidly deferred.

The political and security considerations are grave enough—and to these I will direct attention in the remainder of my remarks. But equally grave, and more shocking still, are the moral implication of our Cuban policy. Or, to call them by their true name, the moral failures.

We failed at the Bay of Pigs—through flaccid reasoning at the critical moment. And we compounded our failure by attempting, months later, to hide behind some legalistic distinction between "air cover" and "air support," in a manner wholly unworthy of a great and powerful nation. What was at stake there was not formal niceties but rather the lives of brave men. And these we callously sacrificed.

We failed again last October when, with every winning card in our hand, with overwhelming popular support in this Nation and throughout the free world, we stopped short of our avowed goal. And the Soviet presence remains in Cuba—if, indeed, it does not grow.

We have failed, repeatedly, to mobilize the vast anti-Castro ferment inside Cuba and to unify with it the self-exiled refugees from Communist tyranny in this country and throughout the hemisphere. In crude terms of strategy, this has meant a shameful waste of valuable resources; and in the more significant terms of moral commitment, we have played cruel games with the hopes and aspirations of all these people—endlessly proclaiming our desire to see them once more free but failing to follow through with effective action.

We thus cheapen the concept of freedom—and irreparably undercut both the material strength and the moral stamina of the forces of freedom, worldwide.

And we contribute to the disarray among the forces of free Cuba, that, time and again, administration spokesmen point to as an excuse for our failure to mobilize the full resources of the hemispheric community in support of a provisional free Cuban Government.

This Nation, in honor and good conscience, can no longer have it both ways. If we are not prepared to do more than talk the Castro regime out of existence, then let us at least muster up the candor to confess our timidity and our helplessness. But I do not for one moment believe that this would properly represent the hardened will of the American people; and in their name, I utterly reject any such counsel of despair. Instead, I urge upon this body a clear and purposeful reaffirmation of our commitment to Cuban liberation. It is a mat-

1963

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

10353

petitive bidding with the chances being that the E.L.K. Co. would lose out to a major corporation which probably would outbid it.

## FACTUAL SITUATION

The E.L.K. lease covers a tract of 240 acres. Payment of advance annual rental for 1963 was due on February 1, 1963. This was a Friday. The rental check for \$120, dated January 31, was not received in the office of the Bureau of Land Management in Cheyenne until the following Monday, February 4. Since, under the law, the lease had terminated as of the close of business the preceding Friday, February 1, the check was returned to the E.L.K. Oil Co. on February 6.

At the subcommittee hearing, the president of the E.L.K. Oil Co., Mr. Robert Klieker, testified that he had come in from a field trip on Thursday, the 31st, discovered that the rental had not been paid, and that he himself wrote the check for \$120, placed it in an envelope addressed to the Bureau of Land Management office and mailed it at the Cheyenne post office in person.

This testimony was not contradicted, and no evidence casting any doubt upon it offered from any quarter.

At the subcommittee's specific request, the Bureau of Land Management made a search of its files for the postmarked envelope in which the check had been mailed. Results of this search were negative; the envelope was not found. Bureau of Land Management officials explained that except in rare instances, such as in an appeals case, letters received in BLM field offices are opened, the contents time stamped, and the envelope discarded. The volume of mail is quite large.

The committee wishes to emphasize the fact that S. 1066 does not reinstate the E.L.K. oil lease. Rather it authorizes and directs the Secretary of the Interior to "receive, consider, and act upon" any petition by the company that may be filed within 180 days after enactment. That is, the Secretary will conduct a full and complete investigation of the facts and circumstances, and then determine whether the lease should be reinstated upon payment of the year's rental.

## APPLICABLE LAW

Although S. 1066 makes no changes in existing law, the applicable section of the Mineral Leasing Act, section 31, as amended by Public Law 87-822, which added subsections (c) and (d), is as follows:

*"Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 (41 Stat. 437, 450) as Amended*

"Sec. 31. (a) Except as otherwise herein provided, any lease issued under the provisions of this Act may be forfeited and canceled by an appropriate proceeding in the United States district court for the district in which the property, or some part thereof, is located whenever the lessee fails to comply with any of the provisions of this Act, of the lease, or of the general regulations promulgated under this Act and in force at the date of the lease; and the lease may provide for resort to appropriate methods for the settlement of disputes or for remedies for breach of specified conditions thereof.

"(b) Any lease issued after August 21, 1935, under the provisions of section 17 of this Act shall be subject to cancellation by the Secretary of the Interior after thirty days' notice upon the failure of the lessee to comply with any of the provisions of the lease, unless, or until, the land covered by any such lease is known to contain valuable deposits of oil or gas. Such notice in advance of cancellation shall be sent the lease owner by registered letter directed to the lease owner's record post office address, and in case such letter shall be returned as undelivered, such notice shall also be posted for a period of

thirty days in the United States land office for the district in which the land covered by such lease is situated, or in the event that there is no district land office for such district, then in the post office nearest such land. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, however, upon failure of a lessee to pay rental on or before the anniversary date of the lease, for any lease on which there is no well capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities, the lease shall automatically terminate by operation of law: *Provided, however*, That when the time for payment falls upon any day in which the proper office for payment is not open, payment may be received the next official working day and shall be considered as timely made.

"(c) Where any lease has been terminated automatically by operation of law under this section for failure to pay rental timely and it is shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Interior that the failure to pay timely the lease rental was justifiable or not due to a lack of reasonable diligence, he in his judgment may reinstate the lease subject to the following conditions:

"(1) A petition for reinstatement, together with the required rental, for any lease (a) terminated prior to the effective date of this act must be filed with the Secretary of the Interior within one hundred and eighty days after the effective date of this Act;

"(2) No valid lease has been issued affecting any of the lands in the terminated lease prior to the filing of the petition for reinstatement.

"(d) Where, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Interior, drilling operations were being diligently conducted on the last day of the primary term of the lease, and, except for nonpayment of rental, the lessee would have been entitled to extension of his lease, pursuant to section 4(d) of the Act of September 2, 1960 (74 Stat. 790), the Secretary of the Interior may reinstate such lease notwithstanding the failure of the lessee to have made payment of the next year's rental, provided the conditions of subparagraphs (1) and (2) of section (c) are satisfied."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to amendment. If there be no amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed, as follows:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That, in the administration of section 31 of the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 (30 U.S.C. 188), the Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to receive, consider, and act upon any petition of the E. L. K. Oil Company, of Cheyenne, Wyoming, filed within one hundred and eighty days after the date of enactment of this Act, for reinstatement of United States oil and gas lease "Wyoming 046887(C)", as if such petition had been filed within the time provided in such section and such section had been applicable thereto.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE TAXATION  
BY STATES

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 223, H.R. 6441.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 6441) to amend Public Law 86-272, as amended, with respect to the reporting date.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there

objection to the request of the Senator from Montana?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 242), explaining the purposes of the bill.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## PURPOSE

This bill would extend from July 1, 1963, to March 31, 1964, the time within which the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and/or the Committee on Finance of the Senate shall file the reports required by Public Law 86-272.

## STATEMENT

Public Law 86-272, as amended, requires the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate, acting separately or jointly, or both, or any duly authorized subcommittees thereof, to "make full and complete studies of all matters pertaining to the taxation of interstate commerce by the States" and report to their respective Houses the results of such studies, together with their proposals for legislation on or before July 1, 1963.

The Committee on Judiciary, acting through a special subcommittee, has undertaken such a study, which is both broad and thorough. In the course of its work, the subcommittee has gathered a large amount of useful information. It is now engaged in analyzing this data and preparing recommendations based upon it.

Although the subcommittee has proceeded with diligence, the issues involved are numerous and complex. The time remaining for completing the report will be insufficient for the continued careful consideration which these issues demand. The House Committee on the Judiciary believes that an extension to March 31, 1964, should provide enough time for it to complete its work.

The Senate Committee on Finance is of the view that this extension is necessary and desirable and commends this bill to the Senate for its favorable consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to amendment. If there be no amendment to be proposed, the question is on the third reading of the bill.

The bill (H.R. 6441) was ordered to a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

## CALL OF THE CALENDAR

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar Nos. 225 through 229, in sequence.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the Senator from Montana? The Chair hears none; and it is so ordered. The clerk will state the first measure.

PRINTING AS SENATE DOCUMENT  
OF EXCERPTS ON THE 1963-64 NA-  
TIONAL HIGH SCHOOL DEBATE  
SUBJECT OF MEDICARE

The concurrent resolution (S. Res. 48) authorizing the printing as a Senate document of selected excerpts on the 1963-64 national high school debate subject of medicare, was considered and agreed to, as follows:

ter, equally, of our national interest and our national honor. Now, let us get on with the task.

Can there be any remaining doubt about the urgency of the problem? A Communist Cuba is no mere annoyance. It is not some minor blemish in a community of nations otherwise healthy. It is, rather, an ugly and a potentially fatal cancer within the vitals of the free world.

In the measured words of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee's "Interim Report on the Cuban Military Buildup:"

Cuba is an advanced Soviet base for subversive, revolutionary, and agitational activities in the Western Hemisphere and affords the opportunity to export agents, funds, arms, ammunition and propaganda throughout Latin America. It serves as an advance intelligence base for the U.S.S.R. It provides a base for the training of agents from other Latin American countries in subversive, revolutionary, agitational, and sabotage techniques.

The report goes on:

Our friends abroad will understandably doubt our ability to meet and defeat the forces of communism thousands of miles across the ocean if we prove unable to cope with the Communist threat at our very doorstep.

This evil threat—

The report concludes—

must be "eliminated at an early date."

Let me simply underscore those final words. The Communist presence must be removed—not endlessly discussed, not reduced, not redeployed, but removed. And Cuba must once more be free.

When the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], in effect, challenged this administration to supplant its eloquent words with positive deeds, I rose to observe that I, too, had been engaged in a critical analysis of our Cuban policy. I then applauded, and now underscore, his argument that the time is long overdue for this body to come to the aid of the executive: if they will not spell out the details of a policy aimed at Cuban liberation, if they will not make good their own pledges, then let us provide the impetus. I promised to come forward with a proposal, more to promote and provoke debate than a full-blown operational plan, which would be devoted to one overriding purpose: the restoration of a free Cuba.

And so today, in no spirit of competition or partisanship, but simply as one profoundly disturbed American whose official responsibility it is to help hammer out the guidelines of national policy—in this spirit I rise to offer such a proposal. I ask only that it be considered in the same spirit—seriously, soberly, impartially. I ask that it be thoroughly debated, on its merits. If it helps move us forward, from dissonant oratory to a national harmony of decisive purpose, then I will be content. I ask that you hear me out, and then put my proposal to the hard test of full and free debate and to the ultimate standard of this Nation's best interest.

It is in this affirmative spirit that I offer a proposal for Cuban liberation.

No. 90—9

The goal has already been stated: the liberation of Cuba, by and for the Cuban people themselves.

What unique resources, what readily available strengths does it call upon?

Chiefly two: First of all, the Cuban people throughout the hemisphere, and within Cuba itself. This is the manpower ultimately required for Cuban liberation—dedicated, ready, and willing to spearhead the operation. They must have U.S. encouragement and support. And they must have a home for their government.

That home, too, exists—right on Cuban soil. The U.S.-leased naval station at Guantanamo Bay is perfectly located to become a free Cuban outpost upon the very island of Cuba. It is there. It is fully equipped. It can serve as a moral rallying point for all Cuban patriots, on their own land. It is, in fact, exactly what the Bay of Pigs operation was meant to secure: a territorial beachhead on Cuban soil, a place for a seat-of-government for provisional officials upon the very sands of their homeland, and a focus for eventual liberation operations.

These are the unique resources that would form the basis of an operation committed inflexibly to Cuban liberation—the manpower and the territorial beachhead itself. But something more is needed—indeed, it must be the first order of business—and that is a free Cuban Government, as widely representative as possible of all Cuban democratic groups and parties. Up to now, we have treated a free Cuban Government as a stumbling block to liberation; and we have greatly contributed, by our own indecision and our own failure of nerve, to the confusion of competing and sometimes conflicting forces, each claiming to speak with the voice of free Cuba.

No one, and certainly not this Nation, can say for sure just who does represent a free Cuba. Only the Cuban people themselves, in free elections, can ultimately give the answer—and even then, only after the full restoration of freedom and the gradual rebuilding of the basic institutions of Cuban society. But what we can do—and do now, with a candor to match our bold purpose—is to call on the Cuban patriots to compose their own differences and to unite behind the one supreme goal of liberation. Let us issue our call—our challenge, in fact—in these terms:

We pledge our full support to a unified interim government and then prepare the way for free elections, within the framework of the 1940 constitution.

We will help this government establish itself on Cuban soil, at our Guantánamo base and, at the earliest appropriate moment, accord it full recognition as the legal instrument of Cuban sovereignty—at the same time branding, once and for all, the Castro regime as foreign-dominated usurpers. We will thus make use of our Guantánamo base to complete the mission we so shamefully muddled at the Bay of Pigs—the establishment of a free Cuban Government on Cuban soil. And we will do so without firing a shot, without risking lives or spilling blood.

We will insist on the provisional nature of this interim government—and

request its executive officials to deposit with the Secretary-General of the OAS their undated resignations, to become effective when the Cuban people, by free elections, reassert their own ultimate sovereignty. We offer the use of Guantánamo, while retaining our full treaty rights and our perpetual leasehold. And thus we utterly reject the notion of offering this key base as a pawn in some future negotiations—with any Cuban government. That form of appeasement has no part in our liberation policy.

We will, at the same time, continue the policy of training free Cubans in our own Armed Forces. These men, in increasing numbers, will provide a reservoir of military skills upon which the provisional government may wish to draw as it charts its own course toward ultimate liberation. Without such an objective, without such a government to rally these forces and to lead them, our present training program has no real meaning. It is an illusion of action with no clear objective.

We will, at every step in this process, seek the fullest possible collaboration and support of the OAS community—in recognizing an interim government, in branding the Castro Communists a regime of usurpers, and in training the nucleus of a free Cuban army. But with or without such collaboration, this Nation will honor its pledge with every necessary resource.

I am suggesting that we thus challenge all Cuban patriots to units in the name of liberation. And toward the accomplishment of this goal, we must pledge our unequivocal purpose and the resolute use of our power.

Having proclaimed Cuban liberation as the core of our policy, we must do one thing more: we must warn away any and all outside powers that we will tolerate no interference, in Cuba or elsewhere in this hemisphere—no arms, no strategic supplies, no technicians, no training missions. And if the interval between the proclamation of our liberation policy and its effective implementation is used for the withdrawal of all foreign presence from the OAS community, so much the better. But let every foreign power be on notice, clear and unmistakable, that the United States means business about Cuban liberation. Let no one doubt that this nation is prepared to meet its commitments—wherever in the world the challenge may come. We will not be diverted. Neither will we be deterred.

There we have the bare outline of a proposal for Cuban liberation. Let me stress once more that I offer this proposal as one possible course of action—consistent with our own avowed goals and with a high potential for accomplishing these goals. I offer it mainly as a spur to purposeful debate. I hope and expect to have it subjected to close and careful questions. Indeed, nothing less than this will fulfill my own purpose of moving our present Cuban policy out of the doldrums of defeatism and into the range of effective action. And in spelling out all the details, there will be problems. There will be legalistic forms to be either observed or overcome. There will be accusations, internally and ex-

10356

ternally, of "war mongering." And there will surely be dire threats about "escalating" the crisis and blustering warnings about "rocking the boat."

I submit that this is precisely the time when the boat needs rocking—right on out of the shoals of procrastination and of indecision. And I submit, too, that the form of escalation we can least afford is to permit this advance base of Communist imperialism to harden into a permanent enemy outpost barely beyond our own mainland. These are the realities of an intolerable situation. Our purposes are entirely honorable. And with a resolute will, we can achieve these purposes—to assist an oppressed people to liberate themselves from a foreign tyranny, and thus to advance the cause of freedom everywhere in the world.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. ALLOTT. I am glad to yield to the distinguished Senator from Arizona.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I rise to pay my compliment to the distinguished Senator from Colorado for the statement which he has just made. In it he is suggesting positive action, which in this day and age, in this city, is rather unusual, in view of the constant negative approaches of our administration.

The Senator has said that we need effective measures today. I suggest that we need an effective measure somewhere in this world, because whether we like it or not, we must admit that we are not being too successful around the world. We are faced with disaster in South Vietnam and in Laos. The Lord only knows what Berlin will bring up. Cuba is the one place close to our hearts and close to our homeland where we can do something.

I believe that what the Senator has suggested is worthy of discussion and consideration.

Frankly, as an American, I am a little ashamed of letting other people down. We have let the Hungarians down. We are beginning to let the people of southeast Asia down. We are not certain about what we will do in Berlin. We have certainly let the Cubans down.

It has been historic in this country that we keep our promises. So far the administration's hallmark, in addition to being indecision, has been failure to keep its word to our friends and allies.

Before I close I should like to ask the Senator a question, to make it perfectly clear in my mind and in the minds of my colleagues in the Senate, what he means with respect to one point in his speech.

When the Senator suggests that Guantanamo, on which we have perpetual lease, be used for the establishment of a free Cuban government, he is not suggesting that we give up our naval base. Is that correct?

Mr. ALLOTT. The Senator is correct. I am merely suggesting that in Guantanamo we offer the Cubans a place, on their own homeland, where they can form a home for their provisional government.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank my friend from Colorado. There will be those who will immediately charge that the Senator from Colorado is suggesting that we give

up Guantanamo. I know that his suggestion does not contemplate that. I believe that at the outset we should make this point clear, so that those who tremble and quake at every word from the Kremlin will not throw at him and the people who back him the charge that he is following the example of constant appeasement.

Whether we like it or not, and whether the newspapers have covered this subject up with other headlines, the fact remains that Cuba is still the most important issue to our people and the most important issue for peace anywhere in the world. We had better get on with the problem that confronts not only the freedom of America but also the freedom of the entire Western Hemisphere, and the freedom of the entire world.

Again I congratulate the Senator from Colorado. I thank him for having made this historic and courageous speech.

Mr. ALLOTT. I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona very much, particularly for pointing out one thing which I think should be made perfectly clear; namely, that we have no intention—and I have no such purpose in mind—of giving up Guantanamo either to the Castro regime or to a new regime which we would recognize after it was formed in Guantanamo, or to any other regime, until that time, not now in the foreseeable future, when Guantanamo would not be of any service to us whatever. I cannot foresee such a time at the moment. The Senator's question has given me an opportunity, which I appreciate, to make this point perfectly clear.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ALLOTT. I yield to the Senator, from Utah.

Mr. BENNETT. I am greatly impressed and very much intrigued with the idea the Senator from Colorado has presented. We have been going along for several years, being told that there is no practical step that we can take, and that there is nothing whatever that we must do. Now, for the benefit of the American people, the Senator from Colorado has presented a very practical proposal. It seems to me that this is a challenge to the executive department, either to adopt the proposal or to come forth with one that is better. It cannot be wiped off the record merely by saying, "We must still wait to see what happens."

I have this question to ask: If a provisional government were set up in Guantanamo, would all activities of that government be confined to Guantanamo?

Mr. ALLOTT. I do not think so. If we permitted the establishment of a provisional government in Guantanamo, we would recognize that government. One of the paradoxical and anomalous situations in this country today is that we have never severed our connections with Cuba. We have only withdrawn our diplomatic representation from Cuba. Therefore, at the time that we would recognize the provisional government, we would sever diplomatic connections with Cuba.

Mr. BENNETT. If we recognized the new provisional government, would it not

be perfectly proper for the people of the new Cuban government to establish embassies and other representations, particularly on our own soil?

Mr. ALLOTT. I assume that they would set up representation in many places where they thought the need existed. They undoubtedly would do so somewhere on our own soil.

Mr. BENNETT. Therefore, there would be an opportunity for that government to have free contact with the Cuban refugees who are located within the borders of the United States, and with anyone else or with any other government that might be interested in the success of the new provisional government thus established. Is that correct?

Mr. ALLOTT. The Senator is correct. The situation as it exists now—and even the administration's spokesmen have said so over and over—is that our dealings with Cuba have so fragmented the exiled patriots that they are now broken into many groups.

It is my hope that such a proposal as this, offering exiled Cubans a home on their own soil, with all the national honor and dignity that would come with it, would create an impetus, a drive, a motivation among them to establish a provisional government, a government which, of course, we would recognize when we were satisfied that it was a truly representative government.

Mr. BENNETT. If such a provisional government were recognized by the United States, would it not be possible also to have it recognized by the other states which are members of the Organization of American States, so that Cuba could again be represented in that important body?

Mr. ALLOTT. That is a possibility. Of course, no one knows what the first reaction would be; but I am sure that the South American countries themselves are as critical of our policy toward Cuba as are the Cuban exiles themselves. I know they wonder why we, with all our power, with all our might, with all our prestige, are unable to assist the little country of Cuba, while at the same time we are talking about keeping the peace of the world. The South Americans simply cannot understand a powerful, strong nation, which acts in such an utterly flaccid, vacillating, unpurposeful manner.

There has been a whole series of such actions by this administration. If we would not continue to act in this way, if we acted with all our force behind us, we might convince those people, and we might find, as we did last fall, when the President made his ringing declaration, that we would pull all the support of the Organization of American States behind us at once.

Mr. BENNETT. The Senator from Utah is much impressed with the idea proposed by the Senator from Colorado. Until another one that seems even better and more practical comes along, I shall do everything I can to support and hasten the fruition of this interesting and intriguing plan. I congratulate the Senator from Colorado on the idea which he has brought before the Senate today.

1963

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

10357

Mr. ALLOTT. I express my deep appreciation to the distinguished Senator from Utah. He himself made an outstanding speech on the Cuban situation a few weeks ago. I hope that he also will continue the discussion of this subject in the Senate.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Colorado yield?

Mr. ALLOTT. I yield to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. CURTIS. I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Colorado. He, like the distinguished Senator from Connecticut, has made an outstanding contribution to our national welfare. The suggestion that a provisional government be recognized and be given a home on Cuban soil, on the Guantanamo base, without in any way relinquishing any of our rights there, is one of great promise. Frankly, I do not believe it should be rejected unless a better proposal is offered. It is one of the most important steps that could be taken. Some of us may have something else to offer; but I believe the Senator from Colorado is talking in the long-range interest of the peace and security of the United States as well as the liberty of the Cuban people.

Recent history proves that whenever the West has acted with determination and strength in the defense of great principles, the Communists have backed down. Likewise, recently history shows that whenever the West has acted with vacillation and compromise, communism has advanced. Instead of being called warmongers, those who advocate specific, purposeful action in connection with the Communist threat to the Western Hemisphere are actually serving the long-range cause of peace with justice and honor. I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Colorado.

Mr. ALLOTT. I appreciate the remarks of the Senator from Nebraska. I wish to make two points. First, I go back to my prefatory remarks; namely, that I offer this proposal as one positive plan.

Second, I do not know whether the administration has a policy or not. The distinguished junior Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORRISON] brought this point out very well the other day. If the administration has a policy, the best description that can be given of it is that it is a policy of containment. At best, it is a negative policy. I believe it is time for Americans to get our whole international policy off its heels and forward on its toes, where it can punch, and punch hard. I do not believe we can steer a true course of world leadership, to which we are definitely committed and which we cannot avoid, until and unless we are willing to take strong moral positions and support them.

I appreciate the remarks of the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Colorado yield?

Mr. ALLOTT. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. I, too, salute the Senator from Colorado for making a most compelling, courageous suggestion of a constructive nature, one which would put an end to the retreat from freedom, which the United States has been lead-

ing in the Western Hemisphere. What the Senator from Colorado proposes is on all fours with the hallowed concepts, principles, and programs embraced in the Monroe Doctrine.

We have reached a stage in our relationships with the Western World where to do nothing, as we have been doing for so long, is much more dangerous than to do something and to take some constructive action. His call for action should produce results either along the line of his proposals or in conformity with some other plan of action.

I liked what the Senator said about the dangers of escalation. It seems to me that the dangers of escalation in this area are much greater from the standpoint of a continuation of a do-nothing program than they would be if some constructive leadership were exerted.

Over the weekend I was visiting with a friend from a Latin American republic. We were discussing the excellent speech made by the distinguished junior Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORRISON], in the Senate on Thursday, in which the Senator from Kentucky reviewed the catastrophic consequences of our Cuban policy to date. I was discussing with this important Latin American citizen the feeling I have that the Latin American republics should be as much concerned about Cuba as we are; and that they should join with us in some kind of concerted effort to eliminate the Communist cancer from the Western Hemisphere. The rejoinder of my friend was that the Latin American people are far ahead of the North Americans—or at least ahead of the U.S. Government. He said:

We are looking for some leadership. We are waiting for someone to give us marching orders. We are willing and eager to cooperate; but we are unable to cooperate in a do-nothing atmosphere. While you sit on your hands, we sit on our hands.

I like the double-edged suggestion that a provisional Cuban Government be established. The Senator from Colorado has in mind, as I have, the creation of incentives by which the Cubans themselves would become eager to select their provisional government and to settle their personal or political differences.

Mr. ALLOTT. If the Senator will permit me to interrupt him, I wish to make certain that my own purpose in this respect is understood. It is not that the United States would create a provisional Cuban Government, but that the Cubans themselves would create it.

Mr. MUNDT. That is correct. I think we should create some incentives. One reason why the Cubans have had so much difficulty in getting together is that they have had not much incentive to get together. They have not had a chance to do things which would bring them together. I think a provisional government which would have nothing to do would be unpopular in Cuba and among the refugees. To establish a provisional government and then to tell it that it could not recruit freedom fighters, could not train its forces, could not have contact with the people in Cuba who are anti-Castro and anti-Communist, would be to give the kiss of death to a provi-

sional government before it was created. So we ought to provide a provisional Cuban Government work to do and an opportunity to house itself on Cuban soil.

If there are those who may oppose such a program—I hope there will be no opposition—I suggest that there are perhaps islands adjacent to Cuba, aside from Guantanamo, on which a provisional government could be established. It seems to me that the important thing is to give a provision government an opportunity to locate itself on Cuban soil, where it can begin to undertake plans for what will happen after Castro. The suggestion of the Senator from Colorado points it that direction.

I should like to ask the Senator whether he believes the program which he has discussed would be in conflict with the suggestion I have made from time to time, in various speeches and in reports to the State Department and the White House; namely, that the first essential step that we could take to indicate that we mean business about getting rid of communism in Cuba would be to intensify our economic boycott, which at least would tend to keep the Castro government in Cuba from fattening itself on the fruits of the free world. Would there be anything contradictory between such a policy and the suggestions made by the Senator from Colorado in the course of his speech?

Mr. ALLOTT. I see no conflict between those two courses of action. In one respect they are quite similar; namely, the proposal that we cease doing nothing; that, instead, we start upon definite planned courses of action which will exert upon Castro every kind of pressure for the fall of Castro which we can exert, and which will exert every kind of pressure upon Cuba and Khrushchev—instead of permitting Khrushchev to exert pressure upon us—to get his own people out of Cuba before, because of certain developments, it might be too late to get them out.

Mr. MUNDT. I am glad to hear the Senator from Colorado make that statement, because in my opinion one of the most dismal aspects of our present policy toward Cuba is the fainthearted effort we have made to establish the first essential step in setting up and supporting an economic boycott in the Western Hemisphere against Cuba. The U.S. policy has been completely satisfactory from the standpoint of our own nationals, for they are not allowed to trade with Cuba or to send to Cuba anything except essential medical supplies. But in the implementation of that policy we have not taken even a half-sized step in the direction of persuading others to adopt a similar policy. For example, we say that ships which engage in Communist trade with Cuba will not be welcome in U.S. ports, for commercial purposes. But if we meant business, if that policy were designed to do something other than to deceive the public, and if we really meant to establish an economic boycott, the least we could do would be to insist that shipping companies which permit their ships to trade with Cuba will not be permitted to have any of their ships engage in commerce in American ports. Such a



policy would have some meaning, some validity, and some effect.

However, when we say to a shipping company, "All we require of you is that your ships A, B, and C, which trade with Cuban ports, shall not enter our ports; but you may bring into our ports any other ships you operate," in my opinion that is an exercise in futility, for it is designed to do nothing.

So we should take the first step in making our economic-boycott policy effective. We should have taken it long before now. However, after October 22, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and after retreating down hill ever since then, we still have not taken that first step in endeavoring to apply economic sanctions against Cuba.

So I am happy that as the Senator from Colorado has discussed our studies, he has pointed out that there is nothing to prevent us from taking action tomorrow to apply economic sanctions against Cuba.

Mr. ALLOTT. The Senator from South Dakota is entirely correct, and I thank him for contributing this point to the debate.

The main point is that we must begin placing pressure upon them, for there is no reason why our country should be the constant recipient of pressure from Khrushchev and the Communists in Europe. Instead, we should be exerting some sort of pressure ourselves, not only in this one spot, but also in spots throughout the world. If we did what the Senator from South Dakota has suggested, that would be at least one positive step toward exerting some pressure on them, instead of backing away from it, as we have constantly done.

Mr. MUNDT. If we took the simple, logical, and completely understandable step I have just discussed, and then moved in the direction the Senator from Colorado has proposed, I am sure—as my Latin American friends said over the weekend—that the countries of Latin America which are looking to us for leadership would finally realize that we are serious; and they would take steps of their own, and steps in cooperation with us, to implement this policy. Furthermore, I believe that some of the NATO countries and some of our supposed friends across the seas who are constantly fattening their economic coffers by trading with the enemy, while insisting that we continue to give them large handouts in order to make them safe against communism, should stop that counter-productive practice. Thus we would not find NATO countries and other countries we are supporting knifing us in the back by making profits for themselves by trading with the enemy.

I salute the Senator from Colorado for his persuasive and challenging suggestions.

Mr. ALLOTT. I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator from Colorado yield?

Mr. ALLOTT. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. I have been testifying before the Appropriations Subcommittee on Public Works, so I did not have the advantage of hearing the first part

of the speech of the Senator from Colorado. As I understand from the latter part of his speech and the subsequent colloquy, he proposes that the Cubans who are now in our country establish a government in exile, and that we offer them a place of domicile at Guantanamo Bay.

Mr. ALLOTT. That is correct.

Mr. GRUENING. And that thus we would help the Cubans who are now in exile return to their own country.

Mr. ALLOTT. No; their return would have to be planned. First, we would have to determine how many of the Cubans now in exile would be offered a domicile at Guantanamo Bay.

This suggestion is based upon the historical fact that in the past 2 years the body of Cubans in exile has been fragmented. My purpose is to offer them motives for setting aside their differences and forming a provisional government as representative as possible—and, of course, we would not recognize it until it was a representative as possible—and then to offer that government a place of domicile and a home on their own soil. That government would then have the recognition of many countries which otherwise would not recognize it.

This development would provide a great upsurge in the effort for liberation of the Cuban people. Today, most Americans have forgotten that we have had many years of wonderful relationships with the Cuban people and that in many instances we really owe them a great deal.

All in all, I feel that this proposal would give a strong push to the movement of obtaining liberation for Cuba. We would be starting that movement, instead of merely talking about it.

Mr. GRUENING. I can understand how this proposal, if accepted and carried through, would have a definite psychological value. However, I do not clearly understand—and perhaps the Senator can assist me in this connection—what would happen then? How would that help overthrow Castro?

Let us assume that a government-in-exile were organized, established, and recognized on Guantanamo Bay. What then?

Mr. ALLOTT. Then I think we must provide assistance for every organized effort which the government would make in relation to exiled Cubans and Cubans within Cuba in order to help them gain recognition for themselves. We are now training Cubans in our military forces. Such training is an empty gesture unless we really mean to use those people, or permit them to implement their efforts to gain a beachhead in their own country and overthrow Castro.

Mr. GRUENING. Any constructive suggestions are desirable at this time. I should be interested to see what the reaction outside of this small group who endorse the idea would be. I should like to see what reaction we get from the administration or from the public. I confess that I feel we must do something more definite and tangible than we have been doing in the past. I suppose other Senators were as shocked as I was to read that a Castro group had invaded the resi-

dence of a U.S. embassy official in Caracas, seizing his wife, tying her up, and painting their slogans on the walls. It was a plain defiance of the dignity and authority of the United States. It is shocking to think that that sort of thing can happen, with no apparent redress sought.

Mr. ALLOTT. It is shocking to think that our country has changed so much in 50 years. That invasion could not possibly have happened 50 years ago. No one would have dared to insult the integrity of the United States in such a manner.

Mr. GRUENING. I thank the Senator for his comments.

Mr. ALLOTT. I thank the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. MORTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ALLOTT. I yield.

Mr. MORTON. First, I commend the Senator from Colorado for his positive approach to the problem. A few days ago when he discussed his suggestion with me informally, I tried to take a negative view. I was a little skeptical. But the more I have thought about his proposal, the more impressed I have been that he has suggested a practical approach to a very difficult problem.

I should like to comment on three items of his proposal. First, I commend the Senator for bringing out the point that it was U.S. action or lack of action which contributed toward the fragmentation of the various groups that are interested.

They have one common interest—the liberation of Cuba from communism. But they are divided among themselves as to how best to approach solution to the problem. The U.S. Government has used that fact as an excuse for its position of doing nothing. I believe that action such as the Senator has proposed—or if not that approach, something parallel—would get us out of the dilemma in which we find ourselves today as a country and as the leader of our hemisphere.

As I understand the proposal of the Senator from Colorado, he is trying to accomplish the original concept of the so-called Bay of Pigs undertaking. Is that not correct?

Mr. ALLOTT. That is correct.

Mr. MORTON. I was not in any way privy to what went on in the planning of that unfortunate undertaking after January 20, 1961, but I was somewhat privy to what went on before then. In the first place, the locale was not to be the Bay of Pigs, but another point. However, that is immaterial one way or the other. The idea was not that we should land a force of Cubans on Cuban soil and suddenly see Castro overthrown and the Communists out. The idea was much more sophisticated than that. It was based upon the premise that if we could establish a provisional government on Cuban soil—a government such as the Senator has described in his careful and well-chosen words—it would become a rallying point. Contact could be made with the anti-Castro forces which were in the very mountains in which Castro himself got his start, and ultimately communism could be thrown out.

1963

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

10359

It was anticipated that either there would be protection against air attack, or that Castro's airpower would have been liquidated completely. That was the basic concept behind the training program which started in March of 1960 for those who took part in the invasion 13 months before it actually was put into effect.

I believe that no one questions the fact that the plan was not implemented during the previous administration because we had not been able to obtain the proper leadership among the various groups that were tainted by the brush of Batista or even the brush of communism.

So the suggestion of the Senator from Colorado would accomplish the particular purpose of setting up a provisional government on Cuban soil.

The Senator from Alaska has asked the question as to whether we would train a force at Guantánamo which would go farther into Cuba. That question brings up many problems. Of course, I doubt that such action would be practical. But the proposed government on Cuban soil could, as the Senator has pointed out in previous colloquy, have an embassy in Washington and a consulate in Miami, in the keys, or somewhere else. Through that consulate or through some of the South American countries, the Government would be in communication with the Cuban underground and keep active. It could encourage and give guidance to the Cuban revolutionaries who are in the mountains.

The suggestion of the Senator from Colorado has great merit and should be carefully considered by the Congress, and by the administration.

A final point is that the Senator will be criticized for some possible treaty violation which might come about as a result of his proposal. We have a base in Guantánamo under what might be called an executive arrangement between President Theodore Roosevelt and the early Cuban Government formed after Cuba achieved its independence. That arrangement was formalized into a treaty in 1934, which was ratified by the Senate. The treaty is very simple. I do not profess to be an expert in the field of international law. I recently examined the treaty. Frankly, I can see nothing in the treaty that would prevent such an arrangement. But should it be argued that the treaty would prevent such action, if we should recognize a provisional government in Cuba for Cuba, would we not then be at liberty, with that government, to make any amendment of any treaty obligation? As the Senator has pointed out, if we should completely sever diplomatic recognition of any Castro regime or the de facto regime in Cuba today, it seems to me we would be free to negotiate treaty amendments or any treaties we might wish with the Government of Cuba which we in fact recognize, and which I hope others will recognize.

Mr. ALLOTT. The Senator is entirely correct. I should like to point out that at the present time Castro himself does not recognize the treaty of 1934, which

was based chiefly upon two executive agreements dated in 1903. Castro refuses to recognize that treaty. So far he has refused to cash any of the checks, in the amount of \$2,000 annually, paid for the leasehold under the treaty. Perhaps in the amount in which Castro is now stowing away funds, \$2,000 does not mean too much to him. I have no doubt of that. So we are in the anomalous position that Castro does not recognize the treaty anyway. We are dealing with a man who does not recognize a right which we say is valid and which exists. So if we should recognize a provisional government in Cuba we would, of course, expect that provisional government to recognize our treaty and our leasehold.

Mr. MORTON. The fact that Castro will not cash a check for \$2,000 for the leasehold of Guantánamo might show his attitude toward a very modest amount, but he does not hesitate to shake us down for approximately \$55 million in tribute.

Mr. ALLOTT. No. I have previously pointed out on the Senate floor that when the Senate attempted to revise the sugar bill, those of us who were very interested in that bill waited until the very last day—the night of June 30—before action was taken. We should have acted upon the measure many months before that. By failing to act previously, we financed the Cuban revolution and Castro that year to the extent of about \$155 million. Therefore, it is not too soon for us to shake our heads and start coming to grips with reality.

Mr. MORTON. Again I commend the Senator. I hope this question will be fully debated not only in the Senate, but also throughout the country.

Mr. ALLOTT. I thank the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, who has been a great help to me on the floor and also in our private conversations, in developing these facts.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ALLOTT. I yield to my distinguished colleague.

Mr. DOMINICK. I wish to join my voice with the voices of those who have commended my senior colleague for a positive, forward-looking, and progressive program. I have stated on numerous occasions, both publicly and on the Senate floor, that it has seemed to me the present administration has taken two basic positions as its fundamental foreign policy.

The first is that communism will evolve if we do not enter into a head-on confrontation with it, and that sooner or later it will be agreeable enough to live with peaceably. I do not believe this, but it seems to me that it is a part of our so-called isolation program.

Second, there seems to be a belief that Mr. Khrushchev is the most moderate of the Russian Communist leaders, and therefore should not be embarrassed by the creation of a crisis for him, whereby he might be overthrown. This has even been publicly stated by our representative at the United Nations, Mr. Stevenson, who said that we might possibly

be able to get Soviet troops out of Cuba provided we did not embarrass Khrushchev too much. How he comes to that conclusion I do not have the faintest idea; but it seems to me that by taking such an attitude we would do nothing except strengthen the armed base in Cuba, now so well established for the infiltration of Central and South American countries.

I stated, as a part of my comments in a conversation with the Senator from Kentucky a few days ago, that I had recently had a meeting with a distinguished Cuban who had been originally a Castro supporter, who is now living in South America. I asked him what he thought we should do, to get his viewpoint. He replied that the first thing we ought to do would be to provide incentives for the creation of a provisional government in exile. He stated that we should recognize that government, that we should give it all the assistance we can, and that we should stimulate aid to the guerrillas and freedom fighters in Cuba.

It seems to me that my colleague has pinpointed in his remarks the ideas and comments which were expressed to me, as well as adding to them by proposing an actual base on Cuban soil, which is quite important if we are to recognize a provisional government under our present Neutrality Act, as I understand it.

I should like to ask my colleague one question. In addition to the problems discussed by my colleague and the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, are there any other legal complications which might occur by virtue of establishing a provisional government on Guantánamo Bay?

Mr. ALLOTT. I answer the Senator's question by saying, first, that later I propose to discuss this subject more fully.

We know we would not be recognizing an exile government on U.S. soil. It is therefore my belief that we would not be violating the neutrality laws of the United States.

In my study of this question the question of the legality of such action was raised again and again. I have consulted many people about it, and the question has been studied thoroughly. Though I do not wish to go into a full discussion of it at this time, I merely say that the soil involved is, in an international sense, still the soil of Cuba, which would make the proposed action very desirable. Such a proposal would stir the hearts and move the blood of the Cubans themselves.

We hope that this would stimulate a desire to do away with the fragmentation.

I have examined the two original executive agreements, and the treaty. I find nothing in those agreements—and others I have asked to examine them have found nothing in them—to violate the neutrality laws. I have found no express prohibition. Only by reading something into the treaty consciously could this be declared unlawful or against the terms of the treaty.

I am not concerned about that problem, although the question which the

10360

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 17

Senator asked is one of the first questions which crossed my own mind.

Mr. DOMINICK. Again I commend the Senator for his positive program. Mr. Castro himself started with about 62 people in the Sierra Maestra Mountains. When he started with 62 against the forces of Batista, he looked pretty silly, but he continued to grow in strength, with support from a great many people who were tired of the Batista government, who, without realizing the problems they were creating, nurtured this creature in their own breasts.

It seems to me that if we could create a government chosen by the Cubans themselves—not one of the "Kennedy favorites," as expressed by the Cuban to whom I talked a few days ago—with someone chosen by the Cubans themselves to be placed in temporary power, pending free elections, as the Senator has so carefully spelled out, we would be creating a fountainhead which would be the source of inspiration for continued guerrilla activity designed to free Cuba from this Communist menace.

I think it is a wonderful idea.

Mr. ALLOTT. I thank my colleague very much. I should like to go back to one of the first points he made, because I do not think it should be dropped completely. I refer to the indecisiveness, and the flaccidity of our Government in its attitude toward this situation. It is one which creates a feeling of hope along with a miasma of despair. It is bound to cause that, in addition to fragmentation.

This is the sort of thing which creates a climate Khrushchev himself wants, in order to promote his form of imperialism in this world. It is this coexistence policy which has come out so prominently in the past few days, particularly since Castro returned from his little tete-a-tete with Khrushchev, which creates the ideal situation and climate in which to confound the world, and permit Khrushchev to make further gains. I am reminded of something which was said to me by a Member of the Swiss Parliament. I believe it is worth repeating now. He said that anyone who believes in coexistence believes that the lion can lie down with the lamb and that the lion will become a vegetarian.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ALLOTT. I am happy to yield to my distinguished friend from Iowa.

Mr. MILLER. I wish to pay my compliments to my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Colorado, for his excellent statement of a program.

I also wish to observe that for a long time we have been on dead center so far as Cuba is concerned. Certain speeches and statements to the contrary notwithstanding, I think the American people are very much aware of the fact that we are on dead center. It seems that every time a spokesman from this side of the aisle makes a proposal one of two things happens. Either we are met by the report that it is warmongering or advocating a measure leading to war; or, secondly, the proposals we make are completely ignored, and in press conferences and other forums the administration spokesmen say, "If those on the other

side do not agree with what we propose, what do they propose?"

All they have to do, Mr. President, is to read the newspapers and take a look at the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. There they will find that for a long time Members on this side of the aisle—such as my colleague, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the junior Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], both Senators from New York [Mr. JAVITS and Mr. KEATING], myself, and many other Senators—have made proposals. They are not proposals to invade Cuba or to attack Cuba, but are concrete proposals which are not warmongering and which would, if carried out, probably get the job done.

Mr. MILLER. They relate more to the area of economic and political activities than the area of military activities, although I suggested that the quarantine or blockade the President of the United States established last October should be reimposed until such time as Mr. Khrushchev and his puppet, Mr. Castro, carried out the commitment that there would be on-site inspection in Cuba.

I suggest to the Senator that, beneficial and helpful and instructive as his comments are, we may expect to find in the future the old "abracadabra,"—"Are they suggesting war measures, or what do they propose?" They will say that merely because they do not care to read in the newspapers what we have been proposing.

I congratulate the Senator from Colorado. I hope, somewhere along the line, that those who have eyes will see, and that those who have ears not only will listen, but will act.

Mr. ALLOTT. I am very appreciative of my friend's help.

Mr. MILLER subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a recent article by David Lawrence may be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my comments in my colloquy with the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT] a few minutes ago.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**POLICY OF INACTION AGAINST CUBA**  
(By David Lawrence)

Confusion, if not frustration, today characterizes the policy of the administration toward Cuba.

Nearly 2 weeks have passed since President Kennedy told a news conference that the Soviet Government had withdrawn only 3,000 troops out of the 17,000 stationed on Cuban soil. He then added:

"We are waiting to see whether more will be withdrawn, as we would hope they would be. The month of March is not finished yet, and we should have a clearer idea as to what the total numbers should be in the coming days."

The month of March has passed, but the "clearer idea" has still not materialized. The only action that has been taken by the administration is a sharp warning—not directed to the Russian Government—but to the poor Cubans who have bravely attempted to raid ports and start guerrilla action such as Fidel Castro himself employed when he fought his way into power.

It seems to be regarded as legitimate for the United States to encourage and assist

in guerrilla-type warfare in South Vietnam against Communists there, but somehow the effort of the Cuban patriots to rescue their own country by similar tactics is frowned upon officially in formal announcements from the Department of State and the Department of Justice. Neutrality laws are cited as standing in the way. It is announced that such laws will be enforced by the arrest of those Cuban patriots who attempt to launch from American territory any expeditions to wrest their homeland from Mr. Castro and the Soviet troops.

Contradiction after contradiction, moreover, has emerged to beloud the statements issued by the U.S. Government. To take refuge in the neutrality laws seems to be in conflict with the following declaration on March 12 by Secretary of State Dean Rusk:

"Then we have felt, along with many others of our allies, that the kind of Cuban regime that we have today not only is not fit to participate as a regime in the activities of the inter-American system, but that with its declaration of subversive and other types of war upon the hemisphere, is not entitled to normal economic or other relations with the free world."

The neutrality laws were plainly designed to apply to expeditions started on U.S. territory against countries with which the United States maintains friendly and normal relations. But a state of war now exists, for all practical purposes, between Cuba and the United States. Also, a blockade was undertaken last autumn, and foreign ships were intercepted by the U.S. Navy. In recent weeks Soviet-built MIG's, flying from Cuba, have attacked unarmed American ships.

In the last several months, moreover, a hostile military operation, involving the erection of bases equipped with missiles as well as bomber planes, had been carried on inside the territory of Cuba. This was aimed at the United States. One wonders what more proof the Government here needs that any steps taken by this country to protect itself are proper under international law and that so-called neutrality laws do not apply in the present circumstances to Cuba.

Actually, the constant use of air surveillance by the United States over Cuban territory is not really in line with the customary interpretation of the concept of neutrality. The continuous pressure by the Government here upon other governments to boycott all trade with Cuba is also hardly neutral.

Secretary Rusk, in his March 12 speech, said:

"Now, we are discovering with regard to Cuba that, having failed to take the steps that might have prevented in years past the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba, that the problem of finding a cure is more difficult."

The foregoing might well be paraphrased and applied today as the administration, instead of finding a cure, permits the Soviets to strengthen their hold inside Cuba. It has even enlisted the help of Great Britain's navy to keep Cuban patriots from attempting to regain their homeland.

Mr. Rusk also said in his speech that "the presence of Soviet forces in this hemisphere cannot be accepted as a part of the normal situation in this hemisphere."

But the Soviets not only have been infiltrating Guatemala and Brazil, but they are still maintaining a military force in Cuba, less than a hundred miles away from the coast of this country.

Senator STENNIS, Democrat, of Mississippi, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Military Affairs, said in a speech the other day that, "without positive action on our part, our neighbors to the south may fall one by one until the entire hemisphere is lost to us." He added that he was convinced that "the Cuban situation is the most immediate,



1963

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

10361

pressing, and important problem facing our Nation today."

Yet the administration is using its influence to discourage a counterrevolutionary movement against the Castro regime, which deliberately invited the Soviet Government to send troops and build missile bases in Cuba. How can the United States justify a policy of inaction against the Havana regime and invoke "neutrality" laws against the only individuals who wish to risk "their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor" to overthrow a tyrannical dictatorship?

Mr. ALLOTT. I add, in conclusion, that I know one of the first questions that will be asked is, "Are you advocating that we invade Cuba?"

I am not advocating such action. That would be one of the greatest mistakes this country could make at this time. There was a time for us to act. I think it was Shakespeare who said:

There is a tide in the affairs of men, which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune.

We had our "time of fortune." We did not take it up. What I am advocating is that we increase the amount of pressure on Cuba, using every facility and advantage at the disposal of this great country, until we have succeeded in giving to those wonderful people the liberty they thought they had won when they welcomed Castro down from the mountains.

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a comment?

Mr. ALLOTT. I yield.

Mr. PEARSON. I join with Senators who have spoken to congratulate the senior Senator from Colorado, because what he has recognized is that where we are is not as important as where we are going.

I was impressed by the observation made by the Senator from South Dakota that to offer some leadership now would certainly fill the minds and the hearts of people all over Latin America with hope. I recall, as the Senator from Colorado will recall, that not so very long ago there was a situation in Guatemala in which an anti-Communist government overthrew an anti-Communist government.

How does this happen? As I privately thought about it, I observed the fact that not too long before that, in a South American conference in which this Nation was represented by no less than our Chief Executive, at a time when the people were concerned about their freedoms, we began to talk about social reforms that would come about through our inter-nation efforts and cooperation. Of course, that was important, but the people who went back to Guatemala said, "We alone must stand firm."

I think the Senator from Colorado is urging that our Nation stand firm, and show it in this forum and otherwise, so that those who looked to the North for leadership and who for so long found it lacking may find it here again.

I salute the Senator. I think he has made a great contribution. I think from here on we may expand the dialog around this subject. The Senator from Kentucky suggested that we do so, and the Senator from Colorado has done so today.

Mr. ALLOTT. I thank the Senator from Kansas.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, before I submit the amendment I propose to introduce to the foreign aid bill, I should like to say that I have listened to the remarks of the Senator from Colorado and the discussion which followed. I do not want to be included among those who have been charged with accusing the members of the Republican Party with war mongering. I know the Senator from Colorado is not a war mongerer. I respect his good intentions in making the suggestions he has made.

Doubtless we share a common purpose in wanting to see the Castro regime brought down, and doubtless this ought to be accomplished by the Cuban people themselves, for, after all, it is their Government, not ours, and it is their country, not ours.

I must say to the Senator from Colorado, however, that I cannot see how the proposal he makes would advance that objective. The problems we have had with the Cuban exile movement stem in part from the fact that many of the leaders now in this country come from the few families which owned or controlled nearly all of the land and wealth of Cuba. These men are not likely to be greeted on the shores of Cuba as liberators, but, rather, as those who would reinstate the plantation-and-peon economy that existed in Cuba under the Batista regime.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield, before he goes on?

Mr. CHURCH. Not at the moment. I want to make my point first.

Mr. ALLOTT. Very well.

Mr. CHURCH. I say this because I think there is a need to find leadership that is not identified with the old order, which, as the Senator knows, was not freedom, but tyranny of a very vicious sort, in its way, as bad as the tyranny that now has been imposed on the Cuban people, which all of us find so objectionable.

Second, I point out that, from what I know of the feeling and the attitude of the Cuban people, there has long been considerable resentment in Cuba itself over Guantanamo, whether it is well or ill founded. It would seem to me not to augur well for any provisional government, that we hope one day would win general support of the Cuban people, to headquarter it in Guantanamo.

Psychologically, I think it would seriously set back whatever hopes we might have that the Cuban people would give this government the general support necessary to overthrow the Castro tyranny.

For these reasons, it seems to me I would have to part company with the distinguished Senator from Colorado in the proposal he has made, even though I honor his motivation and share the end objective of seeing the Castro regime overthrown and a genuine democratic government established in Cuba.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I am happy to yield.

Mr. ALLOTT. I invited comments when I started my speech, and I am very happy to have the comments of the distinguished Senator from Idaho. Even though we part company, it would not be the first time, and I am sure it will not be the last, although I respect him for his own motivations and his own sincerity.

A provisional government does not necessarily have to be made up of the people he has mentioned. I suggest that, before the Castro regime, bad as the Batista regime was, the people of Cuba then had by far the highest standard of living of any country in Latin America. No country in Latin America has yet approached it.

As for the second point, this plan has also been suggested to Cubans. We have not had the reaction that the Senator suggests.

I know that the Senator from Idaho has waited a long time to make his statement. I had not anticipated this long a discussion, so I will not prolong it now.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator. It is true, as the Senator has said, that the per capita income in Cuba under Batista was higher than that of most other countries of Latin America, but that is based upon dividing the gross national product by the population, and makes no allowance for the exceedingly inequitable distribution of wealth which was placed lavishly in the hands of a few, while the many were exposed to fearful poverty.

I am sure that had it not been for the dissatisfaction of the peons in Cuba, who worked on the great sugar plantations, it would never have been possible for Castro to have achieved the popular support—the grassroots support—that enabled him to overthrow Batista and his 35,000-man army, which we helped to arm and equip. The very success of this grassroots revolt indicates the deep dissatisfaction the average Cuban in the countryside felt toward the Batista regime. We must face this fact if we are to fashion a realistic policy that can win the support of the great majority of the Cuban people, because in their support alone rests the opportunity to see Castro overthrown and a genuine democratic government established.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. It had not been my purpose to discuss Cuba at this time. I have an amendment to the foreign aid bill that I wish to discuss and present. However, I am happy to yield to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. DOMINICK. I have been informed by native Cubans that in the early days Castro was supported by the intelligentsia and people with a high standard of living, and that those people supported Castro almost unanimously, because they wanted to get out from under Batista, whose regime we agree was tyrannical. It was not until after Batista had been ousted that they found that they had something worse than what they had been fighting against. In many cases those people are the ones who have now left and who are most active in the exile

groups, trying to find some mechanism or government with which they can pull together the various fragmented sections. Not only are the peons active; a great number of highly intelligent and highly educated people, and some formerly wealthy people are active in this movement. They want to go back and create a democratic form of government.

Mr. CHURCH. I do not disagree in the least with the Senator in that regard. There are some very fine potential leaders, I am sure, who could head up an exile government which would have the potential for success in Cuba. However, those leaders must be people who are convincingly for the establishment of a government based upon liberal democratic principles, and who are not so identified with the old regime as to lack popular appeal. That is the challenge that faces us. It faced the last administration also. It is a difficult problem. I am sure that both the Senator from Colorado and I share a common interest in finding that kind of leadership for the people of Cuba.

#### AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN AID ACT

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I submit an amendment to this year's foreign aid bill (S. 1276), and ask that it be appropriately referred. As I believe it to be genuinely bipartisan in character, I am hopeful it will win widespread bipartisan support. I ask unanimous consent that the amendment may lie on the desk for 1 week, in order that other Members who may wish to join in its sponsorship may have an opportunity to do so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. INOUYE in the chair). The amendment will be received, printed, and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations; and, without objection, will lie on the desk, as requested by the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the need for this amendment can be expressed in a few words. In fiscal 1962, the latest year for which the figures are available, the United States gave foreign aid to 107 countries. Apart from the Sino-Soviet bloc, there were only eight countries left in the world which did not receive form of foreign aid from the United States.

Unless one is to believe that there are only eight countries in the whole of the free world that can make do without some kind of American subsidy, something must be seriously wrong with the administration of our foreign aid program.

What is wrong should be obvious to Congress. Foreign aid has become thoroughly institutionalized. The bureaucracy charged with its administration has a vested interest in extending and perpetuating the program. Each year the list of recipients has grown longer. In nearly every case, under both Democratic and Republican Presidents, the administrators have shown an inability to end foreign aid in any country, once the spigot has been turned on, regardless of how much has flowed out, or how rich the recipient country has since become.

The nature of the subsidy may change, the flow may even be reduced, but the spigot never stops dripping.

The purpose of this amendment is to turn off a few of the spigots by simply prohibiting further grants of aid to rich countries.

The amendment is so drawn as to give adequate direction and discretion to the President. Under it, all existing unfulfilled commitments would be fully honored; only new pledges of additional gifts would be barred. The amendment would not affect loans or credit sales.

The operative language of the amendment is as follows:

No assistance shall be furnished on a grant basis under any provision of this act to any country, except to fulfill firm commitments made prior to July 1, 1963, unless the President shall have determined that it would be an undue economic burden upon such country to purchase or provide the supplies, equipment, or services proposed to be furnished.

The principle embraced by this amendment can be plainly put: Countries that can readily pay their own way ought to be taken off our dole.

Since it cannot be argued that the purpose of foreign aid is to subsidize rich countries, the administrators are disposed to say that it is their policy to reduce, and eventually to terminate, further aid to such affluent countries as the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Italy, and Japan, all of which were still receiving American grants in 1962, in the total sum of nearly \$400 million.

The very size of our subsidy to these rich countries in fiscal 1962 is argument enough for the amendment. They should have been dropped from the list long ago, but they are still on it. All of these countries will continue to receive further subsidies under this year's foreign aid bill.

If it is the purpose of the administrators to stop giving aid to rich countries, then they ought not to object to this amendment. For it will put some legislative bite into their declared policy, and give them a statutory basis for sooner achieving their acknowledged goal. Indeed, they should welcome the amendment, as it would make their future dealings with these affluent nations much easier, enabling them to explain the need for finally shutting off further gifts by citing the requirement of our law. Congress, I am sure, would be willing to shoulder the blame.

Unfortunately, Mr. President, my efforts, over the past 3 years, to get an amendment of this kind adopted, have been given no support by the administrators of the program. I have been unable to overcome the combined opposition of the State Department and the Pentagon, despite the fact that the arguments raised against the amendment are demonstrably without factual basis. Most of the aid we continue to give these rich nations takes the form of military assistance; that is, American grants of military equipment and supplies. When aid can be wrapped in a uniform, Congress is reluctant to open the package and look inside. This accounts, I think,

for the willingness of Congress, in the past, to accept the excuses for these continued subsidies, without giving critical appraisal.

We should stop behaving this way. It should be incumbent upon us—especially those of us who have supported the foreign aid program—to insist that all parts of it make sense. The excuses often given for continued subsidies to the rich are lacking in reasonable basis, as the following answers should demonstrate:

First. The amendment will not "hand cuff" the President. The argument that Congress should delegate to the President full discretion over the spending of foreign aid money has become an artful way of dodging the question of why, on the merits, a given program is being perpetuated. Certainly an emergency might arise, or special circumstances might cause the President to conclude that further grants of aid should be made to a particular country, even though it can afford to pay, but, in such cases, the bill provides an ample contingency fund for the President's unfettered use. The amendment I propose would restrict only the normal programming of our foreign aid, which is really the function of the bureaucracy, not the President.

Second. The amendment will not affect our obligation to the NATO alliance, nor will it weaken or disrupt the alliance in any way. The amendment does not touch our contribution to the NATO infrastructure, or any other treaty commitment of the United States to any multinational organization. It merely cuts off further grants to individual countries, in NATO or elsewhere, which are able to get along very well on their own.

Since all existing commitments would be honored, the amendment would cause no disruption or disorder within the NATO. Moreover, the language permits the President the latitude to continue giving aid to our poorer NATO partners, such as Turkey, wherever he finds that economic conditions warrant it.

In the long run, the amendment could actually strengthen the alliance by making it clear to each member that, as we intend to do our part, so we expect them to do theirs. The continuation of our needless subsidy to rich countries, fully capable of paying their own way, can lead only, as history has often shown, to a corruption of the alliance which will weaken it internally through the erosion of the mutual respect that comes from each member doing its share.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator knows that I have offered much more strongly worded amendments than he has offered, in an endeavor to achieve the same purpose. I cannot for the life of me understand why the United States should still be continuing to supply economic aid to the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, the Benelux countries, or other countries, which are today enjoying a degree of prosperity greater than those countries ever enjoyed before. In fact, if one could conceive of the United States not being a part of this